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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In May of this year, Caroline F. Fawkes, the Virgin 
Islands Supervisor of Elections, disqualified Appellants 
Soraya Diase Coffelt and John M. Canegata from appearing 
on the general election ballot for the offices of Governor and 
Lieutenant Governor, respectively, of the Virgin Islands, for 
ostensible noncompliance with the Virgin Islands Election 
Code.  Coffelt and Canegata, arguing that Fawkes misapplied 
the Election Code, brought this action to obtain a permanent 
injunction that would allow them to appear on the November 
general election ballot.  In the alternative, they argued that 
Fawkes’s interpretation of the Code, if correct, violates the 
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First Amendment, and sought injunctive relief on that ground 
as well.  The District Court initially agreed with Coffelt and 
Canegata’s reading of the Election Code and granted a 
temporary restraining order.  Following additional briefing 
and oral argument, however, the District Court denied a 
permanent injunction and dismissed the lawsuit.  In an order 
filed August 1, 2014, we granted Appellants’ motion for an 
injunction pending appeal and stated that an opinion would 
follow.  Because we now conclude that Coffelt and 
Canegata’s candidacy is not barred under 18 V.I.C. § 342a, 
we will vacate the District Court’s order of July 7, 2014 and 
remand for further proceedings. 
I.  
Candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of 
the Virgin Islands must run as an inseparable pair on a single 
ticket.  48 U.S.C. § 1591.  Under the Election Code, which 
was overhauled in 1963 and modeled in large part on 
Pennsylvania’s election law, 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2600–3591, 
a candidate seeking public office has two options to appear on 
the general election ballot.   
Subchapter I of Chapter 17 describes the traditional 
party-nomination process, under which a candidate submits a 
“nomination petition,” competes in the party’s primary 
election, and, if successful, appears on the general election 
ballot as that party’s official candidate.   See 18 V.I.C. §§ 
341–359.  In 2005, the Virgin Islands Legislature added 18 
V.I.C. § 342a to Subchapter I, which provides: 
Any person running for public 
office must run as a candidate 
consistent with the political party 
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designation under which the 
candidate is registered at the time 
of the filing of the nomination 
petition, whether the political 
party designation indicates an 
affiliation with a political party as 
defined in section 301 or 
otherwise. 
Id. § 342a. 
Subchapter II, by contrast, details a “direct 
nomination” path to the general election ballot for candidates 
lacking the imprimatur of a recognized political party.  See id. 
§§ 381–385.1  Such candidates declare their interest with 
submission of a “nomination paper,” which must have a 
certain number of signatures from qualified electors.  Id. § 
381.  If such a candidate represents a “political body,” the 
                                              
1
 The term “direct nomination” is used by the parties 
but does not appear in the Election Code itself.  The existence 
of this alternative path to the general election ballot is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
“although the citizens of a State are free to associate with one 
of the two major political parties, to participate in the 
nomination of their chosen party’s candidates for public 
office and then to cast their ballots in the general election, the 
State must also provide feasible means for other political 
parties and other candidates to appear on the general election 
ballot.”  Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728 (1974) (citing 
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)). 
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candidate must specify the name of that body.  Id. § 384(a).
2
  
The political body’s name may not be “identical with, or 
deceptively similar to” the name of any political party or 
competing political body.  Id. § 384(b).  If the candidate does 
not specify a political body, “the candidate shall . . . be 
designated as ‘Independent’” on the general election ballot.  
Id. § 384(c). 
In early 2014, Coffelt, who is not registered with any 
political party,
3
 sought a running mate in connection with a 
“direct nomination” bid for Governor of the Virgin Islands.  
Canegata, a registered Republican (and in fact the sitting 
Chair of the Virgin Islands Republican Party), expressed 
interest in being Coffelt’s running mate.  Notably, the 
Republican Party opted not to advance a party-sponsored 
ticket in the November 2014 gubernatorial election, thus 
leaving Canegata with no opportunity to pursue a traditional 
“Subchapter I” bid for that office as a Republican. 
                                              
2
 A “political body” is a “political group which is not a 
political party but which has nominated candidates for at least 
two public offices by nomination papers under subchapter II 
of chapter 17 . . . .”  18 V.I.C. § 301(b).  Neither party 
contends that this case involves any political bodies. 
3
 The Election Code gives no formal designation to 
electors who are not associated with a particular party, 
although terms appearing in the record for such electors 
include “no-party,” “unaffiliated,” or “Independent.”  (See, 
e.g., App. 379–83.) 
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 On May 23, 2014, Coffelt filed a nomination paper 
with the Office of Supervisor of Elections, signaling her 
intent to run for Governor with Canegata as her running mate.  
On May 27, 2014, Canegata filed a nomination paper to run 
as Lieutenant Governor on the same ticket as Coffelt.
4
  The 
same day of their respective filings, Coffelt and Canegata 
each received, by email, a “Notice of Defect” from Fawkes in 
her capacity as Supervisor of Elections.  The Notice of Defect 
addressed to Coffelt states, in pertinent part: 
Pursuant to Title 18 Section 411 
you are hereby notified that your 
nomination petition/paper was 
found to be defective.  The reason 
for the defect: 
Pursuant to VIC Title 18, Chapter 
17, § 342a – Prohibition against 
persons registered to a political 
party running as a no-party or 
independent candidate. 
The required running mate must 
be of like Independent Party in 
order to be an eligible candidate 
for Governor – VIC 18 Section 
[342a]. 
(App. 79 (emphasis and all caps omitted).) 
                                              
4
 Appellant Ronald Charles is an elector who signed 
Canegata’s nomination paper. 
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The Notice of Defect addressed to Canegata states, in 
pertinent part: 
Pursuant to Title 18 Section 411 
you are hereby notified that your 
nomination petition/paper was 
found to be defective.  The reason 
for the defect: 
As a registered member of the 
Republican Party you have filed a 
nomination paper as a Lieutenant 
Governor candidate with a no 
party candidate which is 
impermissible under the law. 
(App. 78 (emphasis and all caps omitted).) 
On May 30, 2014, Appellants filed the instant action in 
the District Court for the Virgin Islands, seeking to enjoin 
Appellees from disqualifying Coffelt and Canegata from the 
November ballot.  They also sought a declaratory judgment 
that the pair had met the requirements of 18 V.I.C. § 381 for 
placement on the general election ballot under Subchapter II.  
Alternatively, they requested a declaration under the remedial 
provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that 18 V.I.C. § 342a, if 
correctly interpreted by Fawkes, violated their rights under 
the Revised Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. § 1561, and the federal 
Constitution. 
Together with the complaint, Appellants filed a motion 
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.  
On June 3, the District Court heard oral argument on the 
motion.  On June 6, the Court entered a 14-day temporary 
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restraining order, noting that § 342a, by its own terms, applies 
only to candidates who file a nominating petition—i.e., the 
document associated with a bid for office under Subchapter 
I—and not to candidates who file a nominating paper under 
Subchapter II, such as Coffelt and Canegata.  (App. 58.)  The 
Court thus concluded that “the agency’s interpretation of the 
law is not supported by the plain language of the applicable 
statutory provisions.”  (Id.) 
The parties submitted additional briefing on the motion 
for a permanent injunction, and the Court held oral argument 
on June 27, 2014.  On July 7, 2014, the District Court entered 
a memorandum and order reversing course.  The Court 
vacated the temporary restraining order, denied the motion for 
a permanent injunction, and entered judgment in favor of 
Appellees.  Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on July 
9, 2014. 
II.  
The District Court had original jurisdiction over 
Appellants’ federal constitutional challenges to 18 V.I.C. § 
342a under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  See, e.g., Roger v. 
Corbett, 468 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (reviewing the 
constitutionality of a provision of Pennsylvania election law).  
And although the related claim—i.e., that Fawkes simply 
misapplied Virgin Islands election law—is not the sort over 
which federal district courts typically may exercise original 
jurisdiction,
5
 we conclude that the District Court was entitled 
                                              
5
 See, e.g., Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90, 94 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (“Only in extraordinary circumstances will a 
challenge to a state [or local] election rise to the level of a 
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to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim because 
it “form[s] part of the same case or controversy under Article 
III . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review the District Court’s decision to grant or 
deny a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion.  We 
exercise plenary review, however, over the Court’s 
underlying legal conclusions.  See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. 
United States, 442 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2006).  In assessing 
whether injunctive relief is appropriate, we must consider 
whether: 
(1) the moving party has shown 
actual success on the merits; (2) 
the moving party will be 
irreparably injured by the denial 
of injunctive relief; (3) the 
granting of the permanent 
injunction will result in even 
greater harm to the defendant; and 
(4) the injunction would be in the 
public interest. 
Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 
ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 
                                                                                                     
constitutional deprivation.”) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted); Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (“In general, garden variety election irregularities 
do not violate the Due Process Clause, even if they control 
the outcome of the vote or election.”). 
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1477 nn.2–3 (3d Cir. 1996)).  The parties’ briefing, and our 
analysis, focuses predominantly on whether Appellants have 
shown success on the merits. 
III.  
This case turns on whether a candidate registered to a 
political party may seek “direct nomination” to the general 
election ballot under Subchapter II of Title 17 of the Election 
Code.  Both parties contend that the Code operates 
unambiguously in their favor—in other words, Appellants 
argue that the Code expressly permits the candidacy (by 
failing to prohibit it), while Appellees believe that the Code 
prohibits the candidacy (by necessary implication).  In the 
alternative, Appellees contend that insofar as the Code is 
ambiguous, the Supervisor of Elections, a governmental 
employee under the “direction, control and supervision of” 
the Virgin Islands Joint Board of Elections, 18 V.I.C. § 4(b), 
is entitled to deference in her interpretation of the Election 
Code under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944).
6
  The District Court concluded that the Election Code 
                                              
6
 Where an agency rule is a function of its “legislative” 
authority, i.e., an exercise of formal rule-making capacity 
(typically through a notice-and-comment procedure), we 
apply a highly deferential standard of review under Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).  The District Court noted that 
Chevron deference was likely inappropriate due to the lack of 
formality involved in the Supervisor of Elections’ 
pronouncements, (App. 22–26), but ultimately concluded that 
it need not reach the question because applying even the less-
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was silent on the permissibility of Canegata’s candidacy; that 
this silence was ambiguous; and that as a result, the 
Supervisor of Elections’ interpretation of the Code, which the 
Court found persuasive, was entitled to deference. 
In deciding whether the plain language of the Code 
unambiguously permits or prohibits the candidacy at issue, 
we “must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there.”  Conn. Nat’l 
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).  If the statute 
is unambiguous, “‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”  Id. at 254 
(quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).  
Even where a statute is “silent” on the question at issue, such 
silence “‘does not confer gap-filling power on an agency 
unless the question is in fact a gap—an ambiguity tied up 
with the provisions of the statute.’”  Lin-Zheng v. Att’y 
Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting 
Sun Wen Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 107 (3d Cir. 
2007), overruled on other grounds by Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d at 
147)).  “An inference drawn from congressional silence 
certainly cannot be credited when it is contrary to all other 
textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.”  
Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991), abrogated 
on other grounds by Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005). 
Here, Subchapter II of the Election Code provides an 
express statutory procedure for appearance on the general 
election ballot by way of direct nomination.  Although 
                                                                                                     
deferential Skidmore standard justified denial of the motion 
for a permanent injunction.  
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Subchapter II contains certain procedural requirements 
related to naming conventions, see 18 V.I.C. § 384, there is 
no statement that a candidate’s eligibility to proceed under 
that Subchapter turns on a candidate’s lack of any party 
affiliation.  And § 342a, initially relied upon by the 
Supervisor of Elections in her Notice of Defect, imposes a 
party-affiliation requirement only in connection with 
nomination petitions, not nomination papers.  Thus, like the 
District Court, we conclude that the Code does not expressly 
prohibit Canegata’s candidacy.  At the same time, however, 
we recognize that the plain language of the Code does not 
affirmatively permit Canegata’s candidacy either. 
We therefore consider what to make of the Election 
Code’s silence regarding the participation of party-affiliated 
candidates in the Subchapter II nomination process.  We 
begin by noting that the Election Code, when it was redrafted 
in 1963, was modeled on Pennsylvania election law.  
Subchapter I, like the Pennsylvania Code, explicitly requires 
that a candidate be a member of a particular political party for 
his name to appear on that party’s primary ballot by way of 
nominating petition.  Compare 18 V.I.C. § 344(a), with 25 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2867.  Subchapter II, however, departs from 
Pennsylvania law in a crucial respect.  The Pennsylvania 
analogue to Subchapter II contains a requirement that a 
“nominating paper” candidate, i.e., one proceeding by direct 
nomination, not be a member of a political party within 30 
days of that year’s primary.  See 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
2911(e)(6).  In other words, Pennsylvania law would require 
that Canegata divest himself of his affiliation with the 
Republican Party to pursue his bid for Lieutenant Governor.  
Other states, too, have express provisions on this point, and 
the Supreme Court confronted the constitutionality of such 
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provisions nearly 40 years ago.  See Storer, 415 U.S. at 728 
(upholding constitutionality of California law disqualifying 
independent candidates who were registered with a political 
party within one year prior to the immediately preceding 
primary election).  And yet Subchapter II does not contain 
that clause, or any clause having the same effect. 
The distinction between Subchapter I and Subchapter 
II was made more pronounced by the Virgin Islands 
Legislature’s adoption, in 2005, of § 342a, which imposes a 
party-affiliation requirement only in connection with 
“nomination petitions.”  18 V.I.C. § 342a (emphasis added).7  
The Legislature, then, has twice considered a party-affiliation 
requirement in connection with the nomination process for 
public office and twice applied that requirement only to 
candidacies under Subchapter I.  From this we infer that the 
absence of a party-affiliation clause in Subchapter II is 
intentional.   
                                              
7
 Section 342a is titled Prohibition against persons 
registered to a political party running as a no-party or 
independent candidate, which might seem to expressly bar 
Canegata’s candidacy here.  The Virgin Islands Code 
specifies, however, that “[t]he classification and organization 
of the titles, parts, chapters, subchapters, and sections of this 
Code, and the headings thereto, are made for the purpose of 
convenient reference and orderly arrangement, and no 
implication, inference, or presumption of a legislative 
construction shall be drawn therefrom.”  1 V.I.C. § 44.  Thus, 
we afford no weight whatsoever to the title to § 342a. 
 14 
 
The District Court’s otherwise-comprehensive opinion 
did not address these conspicuous departures.  Instead, the 
Court relied on § 384, which imposes certain naming 
protocols on Subchapter II candidates, as evidence that the 
Virgin Islands Legislature wished to prevent registered 
members of political parties from pursuing Subchapter II 
candidacies.  (App. 20–21.)  On its face, however, § 384 
dictates no such result.  It merely prevents a no-party 
candidate from feigning association with a real or fictional 
political party, such as by running as a “Democratt,” or a 
representative of the “Get Rich Quick” party. 
We acknowledge that under Appellants’ reading of § 
384, the Election Code not only permits, but requires, that the 
general election ballot allow only those who win their party’s 
primary to be identified with their party’s name.  Thus, a 
registered Republican like Canegata, who obtains access to 
the ballot via the nomination paper process, would be 
designated on the general election ballot as an “Independent.”  
This would convey only that he is not the designated choice 
of his party and thereby ensure that the electorate is not 
mislead to believe that he emerged as his party’s candidate 
from the party’s primary election process.  Under this 
statutory scheme, the Legislature has decided that protection 
of the party’s identity and “brand” is important and the way 
candidates appear on ballots furthers this goal.
8
  
                                              
8
 As recognized by the District Court, this reading of 
the statute creates a situation whereby a person who is 
registered with a political party can seek access to the general 
election ballot via the nomination paper process but not 
disclose his political affiliation on the nomination paper and 
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In sum, the Election Code does not expressly require 
that Canegata renounce his party affiliation in order to seek 
office by direct nomination.  For the reasons stated above, we 
are persuaded that the Code’s silence on this point is not 
ambiguous, and that the District Court erred in finding 
otherwise.
9
  As a result, we conclude that Appellants have 
                                                                                                     
appear on the ballot under the term “independent.”  18 V.I.C 
§ 384.  As a result, both the nomination paper and general 
election ballot convey that the candidate has no party 
affiliation when in fact he has one.  While there is a strong 
interest in ensuring that the electorate has accurate 
information about the candidate, the statutory scheme does 
not completely advance it.  It is up to the Legislature, 
however, to determine the importance of this interest and 
select the means it deems warranted to address it. 
9
 We decline to consider Appellees’ argument that 
Canegata’s candidacy is barred under 18 V.I.C. § 410(b), 
which states that “[i]n any general election year a person may 
file either a nomination petition pursuant to [§] 344 of this 
chapter or a nomination paper pursuant to subchapter II, but 
not both.”  In 2014, Canegata submitted not only the 
nomination paper at issue here, but also a nomination petition 
to seek reelection as Republican Party Chair.  As noted by the 
District Court, it is a “bedrock principle of administrative law 
that judicial review of an agency’s decision is limited to the 
rationale that the agency provides.”  Konan v. Att’y Gen., 432 
F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005).  Here, the Supervisor of 
Elections did not cite § 410(b) as a factor in its 
disqualification of Canegata’s candidacy, and consequently 
gave him no opportunity to cure any defect in that regard. 
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demonstrated actual success on the merits of the question 
presented.  In light of that outcome, we further conclude that 
Appellants have satisfied their burden of demonstrating  that 
(1) Appellants would be irreparably injured if an injunction 
were denied; (2) a permanent injunction would not result in 
even greater harm to Appellees; and (3) an injunction would 
be in the public interest. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s 
judgment in favor of Appellees and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
IV.  
 For the aforementioned reasons, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order of July 7, 2014, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
10
 
                                              
10
 Because of our conclusions above, we do not 
address the argument that the reading of the Code proposed 
by the Supervisor of Elections would constitute an 
impermissible “political test” under 48 U.S.C. § 1561 and 
violate the First Amendment.  See Lyng v. Nw. Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A 
fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint 
requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in 
advance of the necessity of deciding them.” (citing Three 
Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 
P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157–58 (1984)). 
